_{American Seventh Army soldiers wait at an entrance of a Maginot Line fort near Climbach, France. 15 December 1944. Unknown author, US National Archives and Records Administration, Public Domain.}

The question this contribution poses is whether today we are not constructing a new Maginot Line. Are we trying to buy into a false sense of security by singularly investing in a set of priorities that run the same risk? What is happening currently is that the ideas for the armed forces of the future are replicating capabilities and models of the past, notably those of the United States. In Europe, there is a race going on to try and fill real and perceived capability gaps that a less reliable, or un-reliable, United States would leave. As a worst case scenario, an American withdrawal from NATO would confront European allies with critical capability shortfalls in strategic enablers, operational command and nuclear deterrence. Despite increased military spending, the loss of America’s superpower resources, it is argued, would fundamentally weaken the alliance’s ability to wage and sustain a modern, multi-domain war.

Currently, the United States provides the bulk of NATO’s space-enabled awareness, satellite reconnaissance, and high-end airborne early warning capabilities. European states lack sufficient strategic airlift capabilities, aerial refueling tankers to move large numbers of troops and heavy equipment to be able to reinforce the eastern flank in a crisis. Moreover, what is missing is a dense, layered missile defense architecture required to protect critical infrastructure from advanced, large-scale ballistic and cruise missile attacks. Strategic strike capabilities, particularly long-range bombers and heavy precision munitions, are all overwhelmingly supplied by the United States. Most important of all, Washington provides the ultimate deterrent, the nuclear umbrella, against existential threats to the alliance member states. Without this, Europe would be critically vulnerable, requiring new, complex defense pacts or highly contentious integration of the French and British nuclear arsenals.

To fix all these problems, the European NATO members are claiming greater ‘strategic autonomy’, i.e. the capacity to act independently in strategically important policy areas. They are accelerating initiatives, for instance, to jointly purchase ground-launched cruise missiles, expand domestic munitions manufacturing capacity, and establish European-led corps headquarters.

All these efforts are based on the presumption that what lies over the horizon is going to be similar to what went on before. The famous phrase, usually attributed to French Prime Minister at the time of the First World War, George Clemenceau, is that the generals are preparing to fight the last war instead of the next one. There might be more wisdom in this than possibly realized today.

What the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East are showing presently are major shortcomings in this ideal template for the future of the European armed forces. In both these theatres, two sets of problems jump out.

First, there is an unequal division of capabilities which is not translated in a clear advantage. Both Russia in Ukraine and the United States in Iran are using high-end weapons against adaptable and agile opponents, without the desired and claimed effects. In Ukraine, the imbalance between the Russian size, armour and manpower and the Ukrainian people in arms has held out for over four years. According to recent assessments the tide appears to be turning in favour of Ukraine. In Iran, multi-million dollar US missiles are deployed to strike at relatively inexpensive Iranian drones. The shooting down of the American F-15E Strike Eagle over Iran in early April this year demonstrated that American air power is far from invincible in high-threat environments. This type of fighting is highlighting the structural economic inefficiency of expensive interceptors and weaponry against inexpensive drones.

It is noticeable that the innovation cycle, yet again, is a determining factor for how the battlefield and therefore the outcomes are shaped. For scholars of military history, this is not a surprise. Another lesson from history is that success in conflict depends not only on capability planning but also on production capacity. The ability to sustain and scale up military output is as important as a good plan. The Ukrainian case is here also a good example, with the production capacity keeping up with the need, as well as offering advice and equipment in other conflicts, notably Middle Eastern states, which are at the receiving end of Iranian attacks.

What the currently dominant military powers are showcasing in the Middle East and in Ukraine is that superior military power is difficult to translate into battlefield dominance and/or concrete effects which can be capitalized on. The Russian Federation and the United States, the two more powerful states in the military equation, are unable to translate their superior power into concrete military and political results. Russia in Ukraine has reached stalemate rather than dominance. In the case of the United States and Israel in Iran, there is some dominance on the battlefield but it lacks decisiveness in political results. Like the guerrilla, for Iran sticking around for another day, is enough to avert defeat. These experiences should give more pause for thought.

Second, apart from the lack of claimed decisiveness, the frames and expectations are faulty. The battlefields in Ukraine and Iran demonstrate the limited usefulness of the strategic victory frame. The multiple declarations of strategic victory and claims of mission accomplished by the American administration lead not only to an inflation of terminology. More fundamentally, the traditional claim that the ability to translate the superior military capabilities into a military victory, by submission of the opponent, leading to a political victory, shows serious shortcomings. This should come as no surprise, as trends have shown that the strategic victory frame does not align with empirical trends. Military victories on the battlefield are increasingly rare. Interstate wars, based on research neatly summarised in a recent report, are shown to end more often in stalemates, ceasefires or other outcomes, rather than a victory for one side.

This phenomenon not only has a longer history but also applies to civil wars. For civil wars, an important shift occurred in the 1990s. The message is clear: outcomes are more likely attained via stalemate, exhaustion or at the negotiating table. This underlines, again, the importance of a feasible political plan. It appears that in both the cases of Ukraine and in Iran, constructive ideas in this regard are missing. The lack of a political ability to exploit the military stalemate for gain is increasingly alarming. While trends indicate that stalemates are the currently new normal, the political imagination has failed to keep track. Going back to the prior argument, if battlefield stalemate continues to be a dominant trend, this should inform, furthermore, the acquisition of military capabilities and types of instruments to that effect. Do we then need all the materials that have been shortlisted?

Alternatively, seeking concessions and political outcomes from adversaries might not be the desired outcome of some belligerents. Creating chaos and instability for rivals and degrading their capabilities, as Israel is doing, could also be the desired goal of the military actions. This also has been visible in a multitude of historical cases and forms nothing new under the sun. If stalemate is the desired outcome of violent activities, however, the underlying and unresolved political issue, as history also shows, will come back to haunt the adversaries.

In conclusion, what is required is a fundamental rethink. First, European procurement plans and investments are based on possibly outdated ideas, and at least presently show serious shortcomings. Instead of copying this model, a serious reconsideration is required. A good example, the innovation and creativity of the Ukrainians is right under our noses. Moreover, the focus on all the strategic enablers that are deemed essential if American support dwindles, might just be overstating the case. Ukraine has demonstrated that indeed in some of these cases they are hugely overstated. European states must better identify how to attain value for money and not repeat mistakes of others or copy models that already today demonstrate limitations. This would be a strategic misstep, potentially of the magnitude of the Maginot Line. Furthermore, strengthening Europe’s industrial base and defence production capabilities are not merely prudent but essential. Constraints the European member states are experiencing, of not being able to make up for possible gaps that the Americans could be leaving, should be turned into an advantage. Agility, innovation, and the ability to build together could be positive characteristics. With fewer legacy systems, they could respond more quickly to change and serve as testing grounds for new approaches. Finally, as we also know from past experiences, the influx of defence investment, such as occurred during the Cold War, can act as an important catalyst for civilian and commercial spin-off. In this sense, the Guns versus Butter debate has demonstrated that they tend to come together rather than as opposites.

Not only, a rethink of capability prioritization is essential, equally important is a more realistic assessment of political realities. What could potential political outcomes be of current stalemated armed conflicts? Instead of relying on technical fixes, such as a Maginot Line, a viable perspective as to future political relations, and routes to arrive at them, is essential.

[1] _{I would like to thank Dr Jeffrey H. Michaels for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.}

We are facing a world full of challenges, and hybrid threats are currently among the most serious. They undermine the stability in our open societies and tug at the fundaments of democracy. Hybrid threats are defined by NATO as a combination of military, non-military, covert, and overt means, including disinformation, cyberattacks, economic pressure, and the use of irregular armed groups, designed by state or non-state actors to destabilize, undermine, and blur the lines between war and peace. These threats aim to create confusion and exploit vulnerabilities, often remaining below the threshold of open armed conflict. The Dutch Intelligence Services in a recent report concluded that the number and intensity of these hybrid threats have increased significantly over the past couple of years.

During the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw the Alliance reached agreement that hybrid attacks could meet the criteria of an armed attack under Article 5. This would be decided, the member states argued, on a case by case basis. However, how this is would be made workable and operational is, to date, far from clear. At present, we are focusing on deterring and countering these attacks. In our conference today, we will focus specifically on deterrence. Deterrence is defined as the act of discouraging actions by instilling fear of significant, credible punishment or retaliation. Deterrence operates on the premise that the threat of severe negative consequences and the belief that they will be carried out (credibility) will persuade an actor to refrain from acting.

There are two types of deterrence. Deterrence by denial is largely a defensive strategy. It tries to prevent an adversary from attacking by making their objectives appear impossible or unlikely to succeed. Instead of threatening future retaliation, it focuses on hardening defences—such as strengthening cyber defences—to remove the benefits of aggression, making the cost of attacking too high for the reward. This type of deterrence, as we have seen, does not work very well in hybrid campaigns.

Alternatively, deterrence by punishment is based on the idea that a hostile action can be prevented by threatening severe, credible penalties to make the potential costs of an act outweigh its benefits. This is very difficult and complex in the case of hybrid campaigns. Today the aim is to discuss and debate with you red lines in this deterrence. The central idea communicated to rivals is that if a threshold or red line is crossed penalties or pain automatically follow. However, the puzzle is that red lines tend to be very inflexible and require political will to follow through with concrete consequences. Would multiple, tiered thresholds for unacceptable behaviour offer an alternative? Defining a range of thresholds, and creating ambiguity could be a powerful psychological tool to increase an adversary’s fear of unintended escalation. We want to discuss and debate to what extent red bands could possibly be a viable, context-sensitive alternative to rigid red lines that could better address the complexities of hybrid threats. I understand that the new Dutch Defence White Paper, which is expected before the summer, will argue that we need a more pro-active attitude towards counter-measures. Today’s exercise fits into that ambition.

Before we start, I have two important messages for our exchange: language matters and history matters.

First, the language that we use has consequences and I would like to invite you to consider this carefully. While the conference focuses on hybrid threats, hybrid war is often used interchangeably. In my field of expertise, war studies, war means something distinct and the inflation of the term by talking about a war on terror, or a war on drugs renders us a disservice. War is, according to Carl von Clausewitz our continuing touch-stone in all things related to strategy, war and violence; war is ‘an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’.

Moreover, the term hybrid is also not beyond controversy and this is consequential. Hybrid can be defined as a mixture of two different things, resulting in something that has a little bit of both. I would argue that in fact, all wars are hybrid, as they build on and extrapolate from what went on before. The genealogy of term hybrid warfare is of a rather recent date. It was originally coined by Frank Hoffman, a retired U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel and researcher. He used it in a 2007 report to describe the blending of conventional, irregular, and cyber warfare techniques. This idea was originally influenced by Hezbollah’s tactics against Israel in 2006, which demonstrated a mix of guerrilla tactics and advanced technology. In 2014, the term gained traction after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Eventually, NATO formally adopted a strategy to counter hybrid warfare in December 2015.

Not only are all wars possibly hybrids, but also the term runs the risk of acting as a catch-all, confusing rather than clarifying and leading to a potential overestimation of an adversary’s capabilities. Hybrid warfare is sometimes used to describe the means (e.g., drones, cyber) rather than the strategic, political goals (e.g., undermining the political order), leading to focus on technical solutions rather than strategic responses, which is a sine qua non going back to Clausewitz.

Secondly and as a historian, I would like to press upon you that history matters and we can observe notable continuity. This use of disinformation and the manipulation of information to deceive enemies has a very long history. The combination of subversion and manipulation has been used for centuries, if not millennia. During the period of the Cold War, which is not that long ago, the KGB sought to influence the course of world events by a variety of what they called ‘active measures’. These were the covert offensive instruments of Soviet foreign policy that systematically sought to disrupt relations between other nations, discredit Soviet opponents, and influence policies of foreign governments in favour of Soviet plans and policies. Moscow called this the art of ‘political warfare’ -which is also a problematic term, going back to Clausewitz, all warfare is political and therefore this term is a tautology-. Soviet political warfare included dirty tricks to undermine and confuse the United States and its Western allies, split Western alliances, and sow seeds of distrust and discord within democracies. By doing so, Moscow believed that it would hasten victory in its Cold War ideological struggle. Its strategy was often simply to create chaos in the West. As long as Western governments and societies were confused, divided, and turning on themselves, the Soviet Union was winning. – All this sounds rather familiar-

Just to give you an idea, according to reflection based on his recent book, Walton Calder argued that;

‘the KGB was a disinformation mill – a forgery factory – …. US intelligence estimated that the Soviet budget on foreign propaganda was a staggering $3–4 billion per year. In 1981 alone, the KGB, according to Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee, funded or sponsored 70 books and brochures, 4,865 articles in foreign and Soviet press, 66 feature and documentary films, 1,500 radio and TV programmes, and 3,000 conferences and exhibitions. Soviet defectors revealed that an astounding seventy to eighty percent of Soviet TASS [the press agency] media personnel overseas were KGB and Soviet military … intelligence officers.’

This huge machinery was effective in inventing and spreading conspiracy theories. Due to the KGB forgery factory, today we are still grappling with the conspiracies surrounding the Kennedy assassination, and the fabrication that the spread of HIV/AIDS came from an American biological warfare laboratory, just to name two examples. – Of course, the United States did engage in similar active measures to attain the same effect on the other side of the Iron Curtain- All this to say that today, we are faced indeed with new means but the ends appear very old and show great continuity.

The most effective countermeasure was according to a Soviet defector Stanislav Levchenko in 1988, to read international newspapers widely and access information. In our current, online media and social media saturated times, this seems a laughable suggestion. Fostering societal resilience, however, does constitute a main task, together with hardening critical infrastructure, boosting cyber defences, strengthening legal frameworks, stopping illicit financial flows, as well as developing counter-narratives. And of course, working on reinforcing deterrence and rethinking thresholds and red lines. Whatever we choose to do, today and tomorrow, we need an informed debate and good ideas. I wish you an inspiring conference with exactly that goal in mind.

The new government, based on a coalition without a majority vote in parliament, is poised to start spending these billions. This money has been brought together based on the common tax contributions of Dutch citizens and enterprise. It appears only logical that at this point a serious debate takes place about how to spend all this money. This debate, however, is absent. It was not conducted during the election campaign last year and it is not visible now. This is a large problem. We can only spend this money once and the production and delivery processes mean that only in a number of years can we enjoy the fruits of this investment, in what we expect are increased defensive and offensive capabilities that keep our country safe.

Why are we not debating the fundamental choices that are in the process of being made? The Ministry of Defence has formulated a series of spending priorities which need to be subject of careful consideration. Here are just a couple of examples; The Netherlands is purchasing more F-35 fighter planes. The initial decision to participate in its development and purchase has been long and arduous. Now it appears that the country will simply add to the existing arsenal, rather than take stock and consider pressing questions: what is the expectation of future conflict and how does the F-35 fit into that? What is or should our role be, also in light of what other NATO and EU partners are doing? What alternative Airforce profiles could we consider? How does this relate to new challenges on the horizon? What is the role of, and link to UAVs? Similarly, the armed forces has opted to buy again a series of tanks. Not too long ago, the tank was the target of cutbacks and the Netherlands ended up leasing tanks from Germany. If we look at what tanks do presently on the battlefield in Ukraine, there are valid questions regarding the wisdom of this investment. What are our expectations, what is our role and have we discussed and debated the alternatives, also with our partners? The navy aims to purchase new frigates. A similar set of questions needs to be posed.

What the armed forces need is a viable vision as to who they are and what they aim to do, also in collaboration with allies, in a very changeable security landscape. Without wanting to hark back to an idealized past, the Defensie Verkenningen of 2010, an elaborate exercise to think through the identity and ambition of the armed forces of the future, is an example of how this exercise could possibly take shape. It would help in gaining clarity on these matters before the money is spent. We need to publicly debate the premises, alternatives, expectations and likely outcomes. If we fail to do this, either technocratic decisions await or path-dependency will determine the course of action. The time for debate is right now, with the new government in place and the NATO national road maps for reaching 5% GDP due in a couple of months. This is the least that the electorate deserves before spending this enormous amount of money, which presently will come at the cost of many other priorities. Debate it now!

Particularly intriguing are colleagues who are very fast in discarding old cloaks of fierce trans-Atlanticism to replace them by strong Euro-centrism. There are experts who are now very vocally subscribing to Realist theory, while before they had staunchly subscribed to different theoretical lenses, notably normative ones. It is true that Realism, with its emphasis on power, the state and interests is important to make sense of the world. However, we should be wary of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. A lot of the thinking about normative IR is worth keeping on board.

Moreover, not only is there a swift movement of personal reinvention, also the scholarship is discarding many past international relations taboos, which have now come to haunt us. Every field, every grouping of humans, has taboos. The things we are not allowed to say or even contemplate in international affairs have been diverse. A taboo is generally defined as a socially constructed, deeply ingrained, and often unwritten norm that prohibits specific actions that are deemed immoral or unacceptable. In particular the use of nuclear or chemical weapons, torture, and widespread targeting of civilians have been prominent IR taboos. These standards aim to restrain state behavior, with violation often leading to significant international stigma. These are not the taboos I would like to address.

The taboos that have now been broken and are discussed openly are more subtle and they are tearing the field wide open. What follows are just a couple of notable examples, and offer by no means an exhaustive list. I will discuss them superficially to make a more general plea for academic bravery and a radical free thinking.

One such prominent taboo has been the avoidance of thinking about or using language of spheres of influence. IR specialist have followed the mantra that states are in charge of their own future, also when others in the international system subscribe to other frames, such as this spheres of influence thinking. This taboo has been very strong. However, there is good reason rethink this. Historically many states have subscribed to this idea and it is simply an historic fact. The sudden interest in these ideas forms a stark break from the past.

A second example, relating to the problems with the Russian Federation, is the mantra that the West holds no responsibility for Russia’s security concerns. Moreover, past NATO policies cannot be directly linked to the outbreak of war in Ukraine. The field has previously disregarded or even made fun of this type of thinking, such as by John Mearsheimer in a notorious public lecture on YouTube. Moreover, the discussion about whether there were broken promises, such as ‘not one inch’ of NATO expansion to the East, was until recently sidelined. Relatedly, there has been a strong taboo of charging post-Cold War political leaders with failing to realize an integrated security vision in the 1990s. Scholars who have written that we need to understand the frame of reference of the Russian leadership in order to find common ground for peace have been accused of being Putin apologists. All these related versions of this taboo have done the field a tremendous disservice and it is only correct that the taboo is now broken.

A third taboo has been the argument that European NATO members have been free-riders for eighty years by not paying for their own security. We all have seen the embarrassing and toe-curling ‘daddy’ interaction between the NATO secretary-general and the American president, even when the European NATO members agreed to substantially increase their defence spending. This is a continuation of these same long-standing tropes. On countless occasions, this type of reasoning has been sidelined and ridiculed and constituted a strong taboo.

A fourth taboo has been that the active export of democracy is a good idea. The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were the last iteration of many twentieth century interventions based on a flawed idea that democracy could be a generic export product. Not only did these operations lead to a demise of credibility of democracy itself, which has been extremely damaging. Also, there never was any clear scientific evidence that democracy could actually be introduced in the manner that it was. The comprehensive approach has not been scientifically proven and the interventions have fundamentally undermined legitimacy claims and any semblance of moral high ground.

These taboos, now written about freely, should give us pause for thought. In order to think and act in a more volatile world, we need to take seriously all kinds of ideas. This is essential to be able to more profoundly understand what others are thinking and what moves them. It is true that some of these taboos have been maintained most notably in policy circles, political practices and the popular press. This compounds the problem. Not only should this trigger more soul-searching in the academic field of IR; have we not been too close to what is palatable to those in power? Have we too slavishly followed the fields of policy and practice, copying their key tropes and narratives? Vilifying colleagues because they use perspectives or concepts which seem anathema does the field huge damage. Also, if backlash is preventing us from studying what is necessary, we engage in a form of self-censorship which undermines the fundaments of the academy. Scholars need to be more brave and based on evidence and argument speak truth to power louder.

Furthermore, not only is bravery essential, we also need radical free thinking. Only by gaining a more detailed understanding, by using all kinds of perspectives, frames and lenses -not just the popular ones-, are we able to understand and explain the world. Gratuitous historical analogies of the world going back to the nineteenth century with territorial conquests or the 1930s with fascism do us a disservice. History does not repeat itself. It is rich and multifaceted and it forms the record of human experience. We would be wise to study it more, to be prepared for the unknowable future, which tends to take us, time and again, by surprise. Only by better and more profound understandings can we start imagining alternatives.

We need to salvage the field of international relations from the past scourge of these and other taboos. The academy needs to claim a clearer space for free thinking. In this space we need to keep what has recently and seemingly been discarded and we need to embrace more outlying and dissenting voices. Only this way can we tackle the challenges ahead and make meaningful contributions. In light of my previous call for ‘intellectual re-armament’, what is needed is a more radical free thinking. Hopefully, this contribution can be a start.

Nikè of Samothrace, Louvre Museum Paris. (private collection)

In its most popular and succinct formulation, strategic thinking entails aligning ends with means and methods available. Following Carl von Clausewitz, still the most important reference point in the study of conflict and strategy, war is a political phenomenon. It is guided and directed by a political idea in its origins, its conduct and its termination. Thinking strategically means that in situations where there is a need to devise a course of action, especially when (violent) opposition is likely, political aims and interests need to be identified. What is the political interest at stake and which means, i.e. instruments and capabilities, are available, and which ones are we willing to exert, to safeguard that interests?

This sounds deceivingly simply, but in practice it is very difficult. The exercise of thinking strategically is the harmonizing of clearly formulated aims with available and appropriate means that are used in an effective and efficient manner to attain those aims. This should be seen as an ideal type or model to guide our thinking. While difficult and challenging, it is very necessary to do this when human lives are on the line, as well as tax payers’ money is about to be expended.

Examples of what strategic thinking is all about have been, for instance, the Second World War and the Cold War. In the Second World War, the defeat of Nazism, based on the premise of unconditional surrender of the Axis powers, showcased the essence of strategic thinking. The strategy prioritized the military defeat of Germany in Europe via the strategic bombing of enemy infrastructure writ large, which was translated into a political victory with the surrender of the defeated states. This goal led to the creation of a war economy with production geared towards outproducing, as much as out-fighting the enemy. In the Cold War, the key strategic aim was to prevent the spread of communism and the expansion of Soviet influence, the means were the promotion of democracy and free-market economies around the world, and maintaining a global balance of power. The containment strategy had as a singular goal, the countering of communist influence. The use of deterrence and the arms race helped to make this an effective approach.

Thinking strategically is often plagued by a series of problems. First, there is a common problem when the aims are not clearly articulated. A recent example is the Dutch defence white paper in which the main aim is formulated as being ready for the fight of the future. However, being ready is an operational goal, rather than a strategic one. What does that fight -for which readiness is indeed important- need to attain? Also, aims tend to be changeable. In an of itself changeable goals are not a problem, as per the political logic of war. Still, when the changing goals are not aligned with adjusted means, problems arise.

A second set of problems relate to the means. A prevalent problem is a singular focus on the means. The NATO summit in The Hague this June showcased a major preoccupation with the spending of 5% GPD on defence. These means need to be seen in the context of the main raison d’etre of NATO which is the security of the Transatlantic alliance. How this huge amount of money is going to be spent exactly and in line with which specific aim, was not spelled out.

A third set of problems emerge when the means are not clearly calibrated with the aims they are supposed to achieve. A case in point here was the war in Afghanistan, where the link between the number of troops and their instruments were not aligned with the ultimate aim of building a stable and accountable Afghan state. The misalignment or mismatch in ends and means has cost us dearly. The political justifications, at least those used in parliament, of a stable and democratic Afghanistan, rarely verbalized that the true reason for participation in the mission was proving to be a good NATO ally and alliance member. This played out in The Netherlands but also in Norway, for instance. It can be argued that there was a double mismatch: between the alliance politics goals, the stated national political goals and the means and methods available for their attainment.

My assessment over a decade ago was that the ability to think strategically had been lost. Today, I am not more optimistic. While the world looks very different now, with revisionist powers on the rise, threatening other states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the foundations of the international order, the importance and necessity of strategic thinking remains unchanged, possibly even more pressing. While a lot of lip service is paid to strategic thinking, actually engaging in it remains a sparse activity. Here I offer a couple of reflections;

The essence of strategic thinking it to influence others in such a manner that allows you to realise your aims. It is the perennial puzzle in international affairs how to affect others to change course in the direction you desire. The two main vectors of power are persuasion or pain. With a clearly formulated aim, available means and appropriate methods, such a course of action can be devised. Sun Tzu, Chinese strategic thinker of two thousand year ago, argued that the ultimate art is to do so without the use of force.

In the most pressing conflict on the European continent, in Ukraine, there is little strategic thinking observable. The Russian incursion on Ukrainian territory is into its third year now. When looking at the conflict from the perspective of the European states supporting Ukraine, there is dearth of profound thinking.

First, the formulated aims; The EU’s strategic aims are ensuring Ukraine’s security and sovereignty, facilitating its recovery and working towards future EU membership. This is achieved through significant financial, military, and humanitarian support, sanctions against Russia, and efforts to integrate Ukraine’s economy and defence industry into European frameworks. Although laudable, what strategic thinking would entail is the development of a realistic vision for the most desirable political outcome taking on board all sides. What is the vision for a post-war political order? A military defeat in line of the Second War World of Russia is not on the table because the means necessary are beyond the political will of the allies. Neither are the European states seeking regime change in Moscow. This leaves a political vision in which the Russian regime remains intact, while its security concerns need to be addressed. There are major impediments to arrive at such a situation. Notably, there is an unwillingness to recognize the Russian logic and perceptions regarding its security. In this case, both the contrasting values attached to the rules-based normative international order and the materiality of territory are huge thresholds to cross on both sides. As long as there is no realistic, but an absolutist, position on a political outcome with which both parties can live, peace will remain elusive. A requirement in any case would be to talk.

Second, the available means; Suppose there is a realistic vision, how are we going to get there? Following Clausewitz, the political will of the opponent can be targeted and manipulated so that the willingness to resist will weaken and disappear. Alternatively, the capabilities to resist can be undermined. The most powerful instrument that the EU states have brought to bear have been economic sanctions. The large expectations of their effectiveness have been proven rather elusive and have not compromised the will to resist. Moreover, key resources to continue the war effort have found their way to Russia. The price for evading the sanctions regime is very low.

How could political will and capabilities be targeted? There are several options; the political leadership in Moscow could be targeted, the population that opposes the war, or the allies that support the effort, in particular China and North-Korea. Other avenues, such as targeting the Russian infrastructure have only recently been stepped up. Frustrating the war effort by targeting oil refineries and hampering production will confront the Russian population more directly with the consequences of war. So far, none of these targets have been exhausted.

Third, are the ends and means aligned? There is a mismatch, a common one in the practice of strategic thinking as noted above, between the stated goals and the means supporting this. The capabilities and instruments are insufficient to bring the articulated goal closer. The vectors of power to influence to calculations of the Russian Federation to further resist and accept pain are not sufficient to change the course of the conflict. There is no persuasive story that is acceptable to Moscow to cease its operations and the level of pain is insufficient to cause that change of course.

Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk at a press conference in London after attending a summit of European leaders on the Ukrainian war in March this year said: “Right now, 500 million Europeans are begging 300 million Americans for protection from 140 million Russians who have been unable to overcome 50 million Ukrainians for three years.” Indeed, Russia, despite numerical advantage is failing to translate this into concrete results. Moreover, it is important to note that the Western alliance has the ability to outproduce the Russians. This will come into question if China openly starts supporting Russia. A good way forward is to more vigorously target the life lines of the Russian regime.

In short, there is a dearth of clear and viable political thinking, political will and capabilities to align the ends, ways and means. Strategic thinking continues to be in short supply and needs to be urgently remedied. A recurring theme is the failure to recognize the enemy as a thinking, adaptive, and complex opponent—one that analyzes its adversary and responds strategically. The great tragedy of recent military failures is that few of these insights are new. We are in dire need of more profound analysis of the systemic and institutional roots of these shortcomings. Only by understanding these can we devise more productive ways to arrive at clear strategic thinking.

This is an elaboration of my speaking notes and contribution to The inaugural Franco-Dutch Defence Talks, Tuesday 30 September 2025, at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

In the introductory remarks, the term ‘intellectual rearmament was used. This is a very useful lens to restart profound thinking about European nuclear security challenges and problems. We are faced today with a pressing problem of an American ally, whose reliability, commitment and credibility towards European security has been called into question. We are in urgent need of creative thinking and so far have lacked in imagination as to possible scenarios.

Several models have been floating around: 1) France extends its nuclear umbrella to EU states. 2) A European pillar of NATO is formed. 3) A new EU-level nuclear deterrent is developed. 4) A fully independent EU nuclear capability emerges. My contribution will focus on the four key elements for effective deterrence, appliable to all these models: Capability, Commitment, Credibility and Communications. All the models are associated with problems and challenges, which are most significant in regards to the elements of Commitment, Credibility and Communications. On Capabilities we can be relatively brief. Although there are discussions about what number and capacity of nuclear arms would be enough, it is clear that in a very narrow sense the weapons present in Europe can inflict harm and can reach targets.

Commitment

We have a long-standing culture of strategic dependence. The reliance on the Trans-Atlantic bond has caused a lack of debate and critical thinking. A mindset focused on more independence has until recently been largely absent. It is very commendable that indeed the French government has started this series of conversations.

Regarding commitment as precondition and characteristic of successful deterrence, several issues stand out. First, there is an absence of a solid strategic foundation or doctrine for what a “European” deterrent is supposed to deter, and under what conditions it should operate. Second, there are problems with an unified foreign and defense policy in the EU. The fact that the European states/the EU does not speak with one voice, even on other matters that are perceived as more manageable is problematic. Third, there is a profound lack of strategic coherence in the existing ideas for a European nuclear posture. The EU Strategic Compass does not fulfil the role and it focuses on conventional threats and crisis management. In light of the presently precarious situation, a discussion about this issue would be of paramount importance.

Apart from a lack of vision, there are no shared threat assessments. They are fragmented across states, and under-institutionalized at the EU level, and overly reliant on U.S.-led NATO structures. Moreover, they vary widely between European states, and are politically sensitive, -especially in Germany and non-nuclear states, with a special position of EU member states, such as Austria and Ireland who are outside of NATO. Lastly, these assessments, where they exist, are largely reactive, rather than proactive.

A set of key questions are therefore left unanswered: 1) What would be needed for Europe to be safe, what specific threats would justify a European nuclear deterrent? How, for instance, would nuclear deterrence apply to hybrid/cyber/limited war scenarios? 2) Would such a deterrent be used to protect all of Europe or only parts (e.g., EU, NATO)? 3) What is the role of the European population: How do public opinion and democratic accountability affect strategic decision-making? This would need to take on board the fragile and disparate popular and parliamentary support in multiple European states.

Credibility

With the nuclear weapons present on European territory, we need to ask whether they could ever form a credible deterrent. Do the French and UK weapons possess enough credibility? How precisely could these weapons be linked to conventional deterrence on the continent, to create a more integrated system of deterrence?

If Europe were to engage in a process of creating an independent deterrent, this would have significant consequences. On the one hand, it would signal a hardening of the European resolve, which could bolster its credibility. One the other hand, it could, risk provoking Russia, leading to a deepening of problems. In light of the diverse views on this matter among the European states, it could offer our opponents an opportunity to play these differences against each other. This could in its turn undermine credibility.

Europe as a normative power would also have to account for a challenge to its credibility in light of its arms control and disarmament commitments. Again, these are highly variable between states. Still, a European deterrent would go against the spirit of the non-proliferation treaty and against the treaty on the prohibition on nuclear weapons. This undermines pre-existing commitments of European states and would add to a loss of legitimacy on top of challenge to credibility.

Communications

There are at the moment fewer communications with the Russians than during the worst years of the Cold War. This year we commemorate 50 years of the Helsinki Accords. As an historian, it is imperative to point out that how we got out of the Cold War was a combination of deterrence and dialogue.

My contributions here were an attempt at a creative thinking exercise. My two main contributions to the conversation today would be: first, work on a common strategic assessment and a common vision. These necessarily would include a shared perspective, based on a longer trajectory towards possibly a common strategic culture. In the meantime, a focus on conventional deterrence, missile defence and deeper coordination would be wise. Second, based on historical insights, invest much more in communication and dialogue.

Intellectual rearmament to think these things through is essential to come up with good, workable, legitimate and innovative ideas. The presence of a large number of students and young scholars in the room, was therefore very encouraging.

The word escalation is used frequently, but also imprecisely. This contribution argues that this is a problem. Two examples; in the context of the Ukraine War, a Foreign Affairs article stated that ‘many of the most feared escalation scenarios have not occurred’. On 7 October 2023, Israeli prime-minister Benjamin Netanyahu, claimed ‘We are at war, [this is] not an operation, not an escalation, a war.’ These two uses of the word escalation appear contradictory; in the context of the war in Ukraine, escalation could take place in the midst of war and in the case of the Israeli actions, escalation is divorced from war. This raises the question: what exactly is escalation?

As these examples reveal, there is a problematic lack of precision in the use of the term. Also, there appear to be several implicit assumptions about what escalation is, and what it looks like. Among these assumptions is the idea that the process of escalation can be controlled at will, and that it is under the command of those managing war. Moreover, it is assumed that escalation is progressive, distinctive, and evident as a linear approach akin to climbing the rungs of a ladder, based on steadily increasing levels of pain in conflict.

Escalation denotes an aggravation in the intensity of conflict and de-escalation its opposite. It can occur in a crisis but also after violent hostilities have broken out. The term escalation emerged during the Cold War. Scholars focused on trying to understand processes of possible aggravation of conflict, with the presence of nuclear weapons as an important feature. They aimed to identify the means and brakes to control these processes. Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling and Richard Smoke contributed most significantly to this debate. All were convinced that escalation should be seen as a logical step-by-step process based on rational calculations, which should be subject to theorization. The most notable escalation theory, by Herman Kahn, broke down the process of escalation as constituting 44 rungs on a ladder, ranging from the emergence of a crisis to all-out war in which nuclear weapons were employed in first and second strikes, ultimately leading to the eradication of life on earth.

During this period, escalation obtained its linear conceptualization, but also its premise of actor rationality. Furthermore, escalation was seen as relational, including a responsive opponent and incorporating its possible actions and reactions as part of the calculations. The main challenge would be to outwit this opponent by being one step ahead, command more and stronger weapons, and demonstrate stronger political commitment to acquire dominance on the escalation ladder. Scholars identified two main vectors of escalation; horizontal and vertical escalation. Horizontal escalation would include more territory affected by conflict, and more states involved. Vertical escalation would include ever more destructive weapons. Already at the time, critics questioned this stratified type of thinking, as well as the presumptions that all would be subject to the same logic and interpretations.

These conceptualizations still hold large influence in the contemporary usages as illustrated above. We take issue with them. First, escalation as subject to linear, logically reasoned-through steps that are carefully premeditated and wilful, do a major injustice to realities.

Escalation can occur in at least seven dimensions: 1. in the number of actors, 2. the nature of the demands, 3. the tactics used, 4. the means used (type of weapons used), 5. the targets selected, 6. the extension of the geographical area and 7. the duration. De-escalation can be conceptualized as the opposite, as a lessening of conflict, similarly along these dimensions. Processes of escalation and de-escalation can take place in one dimension (for example using longer range artillery), or can be compounded by being manifested in different dimensions (for example using longer range artillery and increasing the number of actors involved).

In practice, conflict is complex; perceptions, actors, relations, ideas, narratives, contextual factors and fictions shape the way political disagreements unfold and morph within and across conflicts. Aggravation occurs as response to short-term challenges, and is informed by ad hoc measures that respond to a particular rationale but that hold limited consideration for second or third order effects.

Second, linear framings assume we can account for and predict the response of an opponent. This is also problematic. While the temptation to discuss conflict as a linear phenomenon is extremely strong, opponents rarely ever respond as predicted, or obey a contender’s rationale. Military responses are guided by perceptions and contextual factors, defined by the political goals and interests of those waging war while aiming to surprise the opponent. Russia was expecting a very different outcome after the overt attack on Ukraine in 2022. War did not lead to deterring countries from seeking closer links with the West, rather the opposite, more of its neighbours are now NATO members.

The puzzle is how to account for the dynamic of escalation within and between different expressions of conflict, and how to consider the consequences of actions, the outcomes of which are not linear and which cannot be forecast ex-ante. If we are to describe reality (instead of prescribing it), we need to be able to consider these multiple escalations and de-escalations across multiple equilibria, their non-linearity, and beyond our assumption that actors are rationally predictable. In a context where political and histrionic performance is prized over strategic leadership, this is something we should take into account when reflecting about war.

For a better understanding of conflict, and better preparation, we need to move beyond linear conceptions and recognize that escalation and de-escalation cannot be described with deterministic lenses. If we are to unveil the complex dynamics of any conflict and prepare for its unintended consequences (think for example the increase in food prices after the invasion of Ukraine), we need to embrace better descriptive frameworks that move beyond linear, step wise descriptions. This is of utmost urgency, as politicians seem to be informed by this linear approach, and are seemingly unaware that conflict carries its own intensity as well as inertia, which will lead to unexpected outcomes.

[1] Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón is a Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) fellow at the University of Cape Town and a Honorary Research Associate of the Department of Political and International Studies, Rhodes University (South Africa), and editor of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia: Transitioning from Violence (Routledge, 2020).

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